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CANADA’S FRESH WATER AND NAFTA:
CLEARING THE MUDDIED WATERS
SCOTT GORDON†

ABSTRACT
Over the past half century Canada became a signatory to a number of
complex and integrated international agreements. Canada’s obligations
under   these   agreements   have   often   been   ill-deﬁned   and   vague.   This   is  
particularly   evident   in   regards   to   Canada’s   freshwater   resources.   This  
article will examine Canada’s international trade obligations, liabilities
and   responsibilities   under   the   North   American   Free   Trade   Agreement  
(NAFTA). It will argue that Canada’s piecemeal approach to fresh water is
insufﬁcient  to  safeguard  its  sovereignty  over  this  indispensable  resource.  
The  article  begins  by  providing  a  comprehensive  and  global  perspective  
on trade in water by illustrating the prominent position that water is
beginning to assume in the discourse of international relations. After
situating the issue of trade in water in the global context, the North
American  perspective  is  examined.  The  author  evaluates  the  applicable  
NAFTA   provisions,   corresponding   tribunal   case   law,   and   competing  
treaty interpretations that potentially threaten Canadian sovereignty
over  its  fresh  water  resources.  The  author  then  outlines  and  critiques  
the actions and policies the Canadian Government has implemented to
protect its domestic water supply. Finally, a number of policy options
are presented that may help ensure Canada’s sovereignty over its fresh
water resources.
The   author’s   ultimate   conclusion   is   that   only   through   amendments   to  
NAFTA  can  Canada  once  again  become  author  of  its  own  future.
†
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INTRODUCTION
In  an  interconnected  world  increasingly  governed  by  the  trinity  of  trade,  
commerce   and   corporations,   a   country’s   sovereignty   over   its   natural  
resources cannot be assumed. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the  case  of  Canada’s  fresh  water  resources.  Over  the  past  half  century  
Canada  became  a  signatory  to  a  number  of  complex  and  integrated  international agreements. Canada’s obligations under these agreements
have  often  been  ill-deﬁned  and  vague.  
This  article  will  examine  Canada’s  international  trade  obligations,  
liabilities and responsibilities under the North   American   Free   Trade  
Agreement (NAFTA).1 It will argue that Canada’s piecemeal approach
to  fresh  water  is  insufﬁcient  to  safeguard  its  sovereignty  over  this  indispensable  resource.  This  article  is  in  four  parts.    Part  one  illustrates  the  
prominent position that water is beginning to assume in the discourse
of  international  relations.  Part  two  outlines  the  applicable  NAFTA provisions   that   threaten   Canada’s   sovereignty   over   its   water   supply.   Part  
three  offers  an  examination  and  critique  of  the  actions  and  policies  the  
Canadian  Government  has  implemented  to  protect  its  water.  Part  four  
proposes  a  number  of  policy  options  that  will  help  ensure  Canada’s  sovereignty  over  its  fresh  water  resources.  

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF WATER
1. Supply and Distribution
Is  the  world’s  water  supply  capable  of  quenching  the  thirst  of  a  growing  
population,  reliant  on  a  readily  available  and  inexpensive  water  source?  
Although   less   than   ﬁve   percent   of   the   world’s   water   supply   is   clean  
and   fresh   enough   for   human   consumption,   experts   indicate   that   there  
is enough water in the world to meet the current and future needs of
humankind.2  Geographic  abundance,  however,  does  not  translate  to  equitable  or  efﬁcient  allocation  and  management.    Seven  percent  of  the  
1

17  December  1992,  32  I.L.M.  289  (entered  into  force  1  January  1994)  [NAFTA].
Jamie  W.  Boyd,  “Canada’s  Position  Regarding  an  Emerging  International  Fresh  
Water  Market  with  Respect  to  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement”  (1999)  5  
NAFTA  L.  &  Bus.  Rev.  Am.  325  at  326,  328  [Boyd].
2

CANADA'S FRESH WATER AND NAFTA . . . 71

world’s   current   population   does   not   have   access   to   an   adequate   supply  of  water  to  ensure  survival.3 An  equally  appalling  statistic  puts  the  
number  of  annual  water-related  deaths  at  between  two  and  ﬁve  million.  
Although when water is measured on an aggregate scale it cannot be
said to be running out, water is certainly “running out in places where
it’s  needed  most.”4
If present water use and distribution patterns continue, the world’s
water  problems  will  compound  exponentially.  In  1997,  then  World  Bank  
Vice  President  Ismael  Serageldin  predicted  that,  “the  wars  of  the  next  
century  will  be  over  water.”5  By  2015,  the  U.S.  Government  estimates  
that more than 3 billion people will face water shortages for drinking
and sanitation.6   Furthermore,   1.8   billion   people,   including   citizens   of  
geopolitical  hotspots  such  as  Pakistan,  South  Africa,  and  parts  of  China  
and  India,  will  suffer  from  “absolute  water  scarcity.”7 The problem of
access to a safe and secure water supply is particularly problematic in
the  water-scarce  Middle  East.  Jordan  and  Israel  presently  rely  on  shared  
non-renewable water supplies to satisfy twenty percent of domestic demand. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is rapidly depleting non-renewable subterranean  aquifers  to  satisfy  much  of  its  water  needs.  This  brief  survey  
of global water distributions and shortages illustrates the point that water is on the brink of becoming a major item in international political
and economic affairs.
2. The Economics of Water
Basic  economic  theory  dictates  that  scarcity  and  value  are  interrelated  
concepts.  As  the  availability  of  a  good  decreases,  its  relative  value  in-

3

Christopher  S.  Maravilla,  “The  Canadian  Bulk  Water  Moratorium  and  Its  
Implications  for  NAFTA”  (2001)  10  Currents  29  at  29  [Maravilla].
4  
Marq  de  Villiers,  “Three  Rivers”  in  Bernadette  McDonald  &  Douglas  Jehl,  ed.,  
Whose  Water  is  It?  The  Unquenchable  Thirst  of  a  Water-Hungry  World (Washington:
National  Geographic  Society,  1999)  41  at  45  [Three  Rivers].
5  
Cynthia Baumann, “Water Wars: Canada’s Upstream Battle to Ban Bulk Water
Exports”  (2001)  10  Minn.  J.  Global  Trade  109  at  109  [Baumann].
6
Douglas  Jehl,  “Introduction”  in Bernadette  McDonald  &  Douglas  Jehl,  supra note
4,  ix  at  xiii  [Jehl].
7
  Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 30.
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creases. When underlying economic principles are applied to water, the
calculus illustrates a disturbing trend.
Corporate  interests  and  international  business  conglomerates  have  
already   seen   glimpses   of   the   proﬁt   potential   of   trade   in   water.   The  
American   biotech   corporation   Monsanto   recently   declared   its   intentions  to  enter  the  lucrative  business  of  water  supply  in  stating,  “there  
are markets in which there are predictable sustainability challenges and
therefore   opportunities   to   create   business   value.”8   Ricardo   Petrella,   a  
trade analyst and water market watcher, has claimed that a “global high
command”   for   water   has   been   building   for   the   last   decade.9   Perhaps  
most  illustrative  of  the  impending  big  business  interest  in  water  is  World  
Bank’s   deﬁnitive   statement:   “one   way   or   another,   water   will   soon   be  
moved  around  the  world  as  oil  is  now.”10
The  commodiﬁcation  of  water  has  already  taken  hold.  Hong  Kong  
purchases water from its neighbouring territories. A host of Caribbean
islands   import   fresh   water   to   quench   the   insatiable   thirst   of   growing  
tourist industries. South Africa compliments its domestic supply by importing  from  the  water-abundant  nation  of  Lesotho.  Malaysia  and  Singapore are signatories to a water contract, agreed to in 1961 and scheduled  to  conclude  in  2061,  where  Malaysia  supplies  its  smaller,  wealthier  
neighbour with untreated drinking water.11 In total, no less than thirty
countries already import at least one third of their water resources.
In   addition   to   the   traditional   methods   of   water   commodiﬁcation  
through  bottled  water  sales  and  diversion  projects,  companies  are  beginning  to  investigate  more  innovative  means  of  trade.  Bulk  freshwater  
transfers  are  presently  slated  to  begin  through  the  vehicle  of  converted  
oil  tankers.  On  March  25,  2004,  Israel  and  Turkey  penned  a  twenty-year  
contract  for  the  sale  of  50  million  cubic  meters  of  water  per  year.12 Under
the  Agreement,  water  will  be  extracted  from  Turkey’s  Manavgat  River  
8  

Maude  Barlow,  “The  World’s  Water:  A  Human  Right  or  Corporate  Good?”  in  
Bernadette  McDonald  &  Douglas  Jehl,  supra  note  4,  25  at  29  [Barlow].  
9
Ibid.  at  38.
10
Ibid.  at  38.
11
  Brian  Anderson,  “Selling  Great  Lakes  Water  to  a  Thirsty  World:  Legal,  Policy  &  
Trade  Considerations”  (1999)  Buff.  Envtl.  L.J.  215  at  242  [Anderson].
12
Dr.  Isabel  Al  Assar,  “Future  Trading  of  Water  as  a  Commodity”  (Paper  presented  
to  the  Third  International  Symposium,  University  of  Dundee,  June  14,  2000)  Paper  
updated  January  2005.    
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and  transported  via  converted  oil  tankers  to  Israel.  Jonathan  Peled,  an  
Israeli  Foreign  Ministry  spokesperson,  has  said,  “this  landmark  agreement  transforms  water  into  an  internationally  accepted  ‘commodity.’”13
This agreement between Turkey and Israel relocates the fresh water debate from intellectual and academic realms into the real world of politics,  proﬁt  and  economics.
3. Locating Canada’s Water Issue
In  the  North  American  context,  the  politics  of  water  operates  in  a  particularly   unique   and   challenging   context.   Water   experts   estimate   that  
Canada holds between nine and twenty percent of the global share of
fresh water resources.14  The  exact  percentage  is  dependent  on  whether  
Canada’s inaccessible fresh water supplies – the water ‘locked away’ in
glaciers  and  the  far  North  –  is  included  in  the  equation.  Even  if  the  more  
conservative  ﬁgure  of  nine  percent  is  adopted,  the  undeniable  conclusion  is  that  Canada  enjoys  an  abundant  supply  of  this  increasingly  valuable  resource.  The  value  of  Canada’s  fresh  water  supply  becomes  even  
more astounding when computed on a per capita basis. The combination
of low population density and staggering supply places Canada in the
position as a gatekeeper of the world’s water supply.
The United States, in contrast, has only one tenth of Canada’s water
and nearly ten times its population.15 Furthermore, America has become
reliant on unsustainable means to meet its current water demands – a
trend witnessed throughout the western world. Water is currently being
pumped  from  subterranean  aquifers  at  alarming  rates.  The  Olgatha  underground  aquifer,  which  covers  one  third  of  the  United  States,  “is  being  
depleted  at  a  rate  eight  times  faster  than  it  is  replenished.”16 The largescale  diversion  projects  and  the  irrigation  techniques  of  the  American  
Southwest  exemplify  the  U.S.’s  water  predicament.  Arizona,  once  a  dry  
and  barren  wasteland,  has  deﬁed  environmental  constraints  by  irrigating  
5,000  square  kilometres  of  desert  for  crop  production.  The  Imperial  Irrigation  District,  a  2,000  square  kilometre  strip  of  irrigated  farmland  in  
13

Ibid.
Baumann, supra  note  5  at  112;;  Boyd,  supra  note  2  at  328.
15  
Anderson, supra  note  11  at  218.
16
  Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 30.
14  
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California,  has  similarly  relied  on  vast  diversion  projects  and  wholesale  
groundwater  extractions  to  create  favourable  farming  conditions.17 The
American southwest has built its prosperity on the assumed constant of
an  inexpensive  and  readily  available  source  of  water.  The  future  prosperity  and  growth  of  the  region  will  depend  on  the  continued  existence  
of a cheap water supply. As the twin factors of increased demand and
decreased  supply  begin  to  take  hold,  the  United  States  will  inevitably  
look to its northern neighbour to help supplement its water supplies.
4. Normative Dynamics
Should the basic tenets of supply and demand dictate the allocation of
the  world’s  water?  Professor  Joseph  Sax  argues  that  water  is  more  than  
just  a  common  natural  resource.    He  characterizes  water  as  a  “heritage  
resource”,  grouping  it  not  with  resources  such  as  oil,  gas  and  forestry,  
but rather bestowing water with its own special status.18  Professor  Sax  
notes  that  a  community’s  attachment  to  this  “unique  life-  and  economy-
sustaining”  resource  is  more  aligned  with  an  attachment  to  architecture,  
art or other cultural iconography than the other category of natural resources.19
Most  Canadians  appear  to  subscribe  to  the  notion  that  the  true  value  
of  water  cannot  be  measured  in  simple  monetary  terms.  When  the  government   of   British   Columbia   crafted   plans   to   allow   for   the   export   of  
water  to  the  United  States  via  converted  tankers,  the  public  reacted  with  
visceral   distaste.20   The   proposed   exportation   and   commodiﬁcation   of  
water  spurred  a  heated  and  contentious  debate  that  led  the  B.C.  government  to  place  a  moratorium  on  fresh  water  exports.  When  the  water  debate  reached  the  ﬂoor  of  the  House  of  Commons,  veteran  MP  Bill  Blaikie  proclaimed,  “water  is  as  Canadian  as  hockey,  as  the  Mounties,  as  the  
beaver.”21  After  a  similar  venture  was  proposed  by  an  Ontario  company,  
17

Scott  Philip  Little,  “Canada’s  Capacity  to  Control  the  Flow:  Water  Export  and  the  
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement”  (1999)  8  Pace  Int’l  L.  Rev.  127  at  128,  129  
[Little].
18  
Anderson, supra note 11 at 216.
19
Anderson, supra note 11 at 216.
20
Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 31.
21
Anderson, supra note 11 at 216.
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and  an  equally  harsh  public  reaction,  the  Canadian  government  implemented a federal moratorium on bulk water transfers.22 In defending the
moratorium,  then  Canadian  Foreign  Affairs  Minister  Lloyd  Axworthy  
bluntly  declared,  “[water]  is  not  just  a  commodity.”23
The  issue  of  water  export  is  thus  immersed  in  a  host  of  normative,  
ethical,  ﬁnancial,  political  and  economic  claims.  Although  Canada  will  
eventually  have  to  face  these  claims,  a  threshold  question  must  ﬁrst  be  
answered:  given  international  commitments,  is  Canada  restricted  in  how  
it  manages,  controls  and  distributes  its  water?  A  partial  answer  to  this  
quandary  lies  in  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement.

II. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
1. An Overview
NAFTA  creates  a  comprehensive  and  complex  trade  regime  that  binds  
the  Canadian  government  to  a  host  of  trilateral  obligations.  Trade  experts  
have  identiﬁed  Chapter  3  (Trade  in  Goods)  and  Chapter  11 (Investment)  
as   potentially   constraining   Canada’s   discretion   over   its   water   policy.  
Although some commentaries suggest that Chapter 12 (Cross Border
Trade  in  Services)  may  also  potentially  hinder  Canada’s  ability  to  make  
policy,   the   majority   of   academic   literature   and   governmental   analysis  
on  the  subject  identiﬁes  Chapters  3  and  11  as  the  chief  impediments  to  
Canada’s  ability  to  exert  sovereign  control  over  its  water  resources. The
following analysis will therefore focus on Chapters 3 and 11.
2. Chapter 3: Trade in Goods
i. Article 300: Scope and Coverage
a. Threshold  Issue
The  threshold  issue  in  the  debate  over  fresh  water  exports  is  whether  
NAFTA applies to water. Article 300 states that Chapter 3 of NAFTA
22
23

Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 29.
Anderson, supra note 11 at 217.

76 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

only  applies  to  “trade  in  goods  of  a  Party.”24  Therefore,  the  provisions  
in Chapter 3 of the NAFTA  only  apply  to  water  if  it  ﬁrst  qualiﬁes  as  a  
“good.”
Article 201 of NAFTA  deﬁnes  “goods  of  a  Party”  as  “domestic  products as these are understood in the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  
Trade  (GATT)  or  such  goods  as  the  Parties  may  agree,  and  includes  originating  goods  of  that  Party.”25 The GATT  deﬁnes  water,  by  reference  to  
the International  Convention  on  the  Harmonized  Commodity  Description and Coding System,  as  “including  natural  or  artiﬁcial  mineral  water and aerated waters, not containing added sugar or other sweetening
matter  nor  ﬂavoured;;  ice  and  snow.”26 An  explanatory  note  to  the  tariff  
schedule  further  provides  that  water  includes  “ordinary  natural  water  of  
all  kinds  (other  than  sea  water).”27
On its face, the GATT  tariff  schedule  appears  to  characterize  water  as  
a good and thus incorporates it into NAFTA by operation of Articles 201
and  300.  The  Canadian  government  and  a  host  of  academic  commentators  have  challenged  this  interpretation.  The  assertion  that  water  is  not  a  
“good,”  and  therefore  not  applicable  to  NAFTA  obligations, is one of the
government’s  chief  assumptions  underlying  its  water  policy.28
ii. Is Water a Good?
The  Canadian  government  and  other  subscribers  to  the  view  that  water  
is  not  a  “good”  enlist  the  following  arguments  in  support  of  their  position.
First,  proponents  of  the  view  that  water  does  not  qualify  as  a  “good”  
focus   on   the   deﬁnition   of   “good”   in   NAFTA’s Chapter 2. Article 201
deﬁnes   the   “goods   of   a   Party”   as   “domestic   products   as   […]   understood under the General  Agreement   on   Tariffs   and   Trade.”  The   argument  follows  that  for  an  item  to  be  a  “good”  under  NAFTA, it must be a
24  

NAFTA, supra note 1.
  30  October  1947,  58  U.N.T.S.  187  (entered  into  force  1  January  1948)  [GATT  
1947].
26
  June  14,  1983,  1503  U.N.T.S.  3,  4  (entered  into  force  1  January  1988).
27
Boyd, supra note  2  at  134.
28  
  Canada,  Department  of  Environment,  The  Management  of  Water:  Frequently  
Asked Questions,  Question  #  5,  online:  <  http://www.ec.gc.ca/water/en/manage/  
removal/e_FAQ.htm#5  >  [FAQ].
25  
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“product”  under  the  GATT.  The  term  “product”  is  not  deﬁned  under  the  
GATT,  however  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  deﬁnes  “product”  as  “a  
thing  produced.”29 An interpretation that emphasises the GATT “product”  requirement  mandates  that  before  a  resource  qualiﬁes  as  a  “good,”  
it   must   ﬁrst   undergo   a   process   that   somehow   transforms   the   resource  
into an item of commerce.30 Proponents   of   this   view   assert   that   since  
water  in  its  natural  state  is  an  unexploited  resource,  like  oil  and  gas  in  
the  ground,  it  is  not  a  “product”  and  therefore  not  subject  to  the  provisions of Chapter 3. The counter argument to this interpretation of Article
201 is a simple reliance on the unambiguous wording of the GATT’s
tariff schedule which states, “ordinary water of all kinds (other than sea
water)”  qualiﬁes  as  a  “good.”31
Second,  the  Canadian  government  insists  that  the  inclusion  of  water  
as a tariff heading under the GATT  is  not  determinative.  In  a  1999  policy  
paper released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade,  the  Canadian  government  argues  that  the  GATT tariff schedule
“does  not  tell  us  if  and  when  water  is  a  good;;  it  only  tells  us  that  when  
water  is  classiﬁed  as  a  good,  it  falls  under  a  particular  tariff  heading.”32
The  government  insists  that  to  imbue  the  schedule  with  substantive  interpretive  content  is  to  adopt  a  “mistaken  view”  of  the  tariff  schedule.  
Furthermore,  the  government  explains  that  the  tariff  schedule  is  merely  
an   “organizational   structure”,   utilized   for   the   purposes   of   administrative  classiﬁcation  and  ease  of  reference  and  it  is  silent  on  the  issue  of  
whether  water  is  a  “good.”33
Third,  a  1993  Joint  Statement,  released  by  the  Canadian  government,  
is put forth as proof that water remains outside the rubric of Chapter 3:
The  governments  of  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  in  order  
to   correct   false   interpretations,   have   agreed   to   state   the   following  
jointly   and   publicly   as   Parties   to   the   North  American   Free   Trade  
Agreement (NAFTA):
29

2d ed, s.v.  “product”.
  Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 33.
31
Boyd, supra  note  2  at  134.
32
Canada,  Public  Works  Canada,  Law  and  Government  Division,  Bulk Water
Removals,  Water  Exports  and  the  NAFTA,  David  Johansen  (PRB  00-41E),  20  
February  2001  (Updated  31  January  2002),  online:  <  http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca  
/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0041-e.htm>  [Johansen].
33
Ibid.
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The NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water resources of any
Party  to  the  Agreement.
Unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become
a  good  or  product,  it  is  not  covered  by  the  provisions  of  any  trade  
agreement,  including  the  NAFTA  […].  Water  in  its  natural  state  in  
lakes,  rivers,  reservoirs,  aquifers,  water  basins  and  the  like  is  not  a  
good  or  product,  is  not  traded,  and  therefore  is  not  and  has  never  
been subject to the terms of any trade agreement.34

The   blunt   wording   and   authoritative   tone   of   the   Joint   Statement  
lends  credibility  to  the  Canadian  government’s  position.  A  number  of  
political  and  legal  realities,  however,  detract  from  this  stance.  A  common  critique  of  the  government’s  reliance  on  the  Joint  Statement  is  that  
it is not legally binding upon the NAFTA parties.35 At best, the Joint
Statement  can  be  characterized  as  “soft  law”  and  utilized  only  as  a  tool  
of treaty interpretation.36  Furthermore,  even  reliance  on  the  Joint  Statement  for  the  purposes  of  treaty  interpretation  may  be  problematic  given  
subsequent  U.S.  declarations.  A  United  States  announcement  released  
the  same  day  as  the  above  Joint  Statement,  lacks  the  deﬁnitive  wording  
and  unwavering  tone  of  the  Canadian  release:
[T]he  Governments  of  the  United  States,  Canada,  and  Mexico  are  
today releasing a joint statement of future work on dumping and
antidumping  duties  and  subsidies  and  countervailing  duties,  and  a  
joint statement on natural water resources and the NAFTA. None of
these  statements  change  the  NAFTA  in  any  way.37

This less than compelling American release coupled with the fact
that  “it  has  long  been  recognized  in  international  practice  that  governments may agree on joint statements of policy or intention that do not
establish  legal  obligations,”  severely  curtails  the  Canadian  position  that  

34  

Governments  of  Canada,  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  Joint  Statement  (1  
December 1993) cited to: Johansen, supra note 33.
35  
West  Coast  Environmental  Law,  Legal  Opinion  commissioned  by  the  Council  
of  Canadians  re:    Water  Export  Controls  and  Canadian  Environmental  Trade  
Obligations,  17  August  1999  [WCEL].
36
Little, supra  note  17  at  140.
37
WCEL, supra  note  35.[emphasis  added].
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its  unilaterally  released  and  unsigned  1993  joint  statement  disqualiﬁes  
water from Chapter 3.38
Fourth, proponents rely on Canadian domestic legislation to buttress their claim that water is not a NAFTA  “good.”  Section  7(2)  of  the  
North  American  Free  Trade  Implementation  Act  states that only water
“packaged  as  a  beverage  or  in  tanks,  but  not  natural,  surface  and  ground  
water”  falls  within  the  scope  of  NAFTA.39  The  ﬂaws  in  this  argument  are  
twofold.  First,  there  is  no  analogous  caveat  to  the  deﬁnition  of  “good”  
in   the   actual   text   of   NAFTA.   Since   inherent   authority   to   override   the  
provisions  of  an  international  agreement  is  not  embedded  in  domestic  
legislation, s. 7(2) is not binding on the NAFTA parties. Second, and
perhaps  more  signiﬁcant,  is  the  fact  that  the  Canadian  government  felt  
the  need  to  include  a  restrictive  deﬁnition  of  water  in  domestic  legislation  yet  failed  to  effect  parallel  safeguards  in  the  actual  provisions  of  
NAFTA.  Given  the  close  temporal  proximity  between  the  drafting  of  the  
implementation legislation and the actual drafting of NAFTA, the logical
inference is that the Canadian negotiating delegation made a conscious
decision,  or  simply  lacked  sufﬁcient  leverage,  to  expressly  exclude  water from NAFTA.
The  arguments  that  water  is  excluded  from  the  ambit  of  Chapter  3  
are,  on  the  whole,  unconvincing.  Reliance  on  a  highly  sophistic  treaty  
interpretation of the GATT tariff schedule, a legally unenforceable joint
statement  and  domestic  legislation  are  an  insufﬁcient  basis  to  conclude  
that  water  is  not  a  “good.”  
In  addition  to  the  countervailing  arguments  cited  above,  American  
jurisprudence and international case law adopt the position that water
is  a  “good.”  In  Sporhase v Nebraska, the Supreme Court of the United States held that water is an article of commerce under U.S. law.40
The case concerned a Nebraska law limiting the rights of neighbouring
states to apply for water use permits. Nebraska argued that state ownership  of  a  resource  entitled  it  to  discriminate  against  out-of-state  investors  and,  alternatively,  given  that  water  is  essential  for  human  survival  
it  deserves  special  status  apart  from  other  natural  resources.41 The Court
38  

  Jerome  Hinkle,  “Troubled  Waters:  Policy  and  Action  in  the  Great  Lakes”  (2003)  20
T.M.  Cooley  L.  Review  281  at  302  [Hinkle].
39
  S.C.  1993,  c.  44.
40  
  458  U.S.  941  (1982).
41  
  Maravilla,  supra note 3 at 33.
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struck down the law as unconstitutional and concluded that water was
an article of commerce, largely because of the nature of, and trade in,
commodities almost wholly comprised of water.
International  law  also  holds  that  water  is  a  “good.”  In  Commission
v. Italy,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  held  that  the  term  “good”  encompasses   anything   capable   of   monetary   evaluation   that   is   placed   within  
the  ﬂow  of  commerce.42 Similarly, in Dunbalk  Water  Supply, the Court
gave  an  equally  wide  interpretation  of  “goods.”43 It held that the term
not only includes materials produced, but also materials supplied in, the
provision   of   services.44  The   wide   latitude   given   to   the   deﬁnition   of   a  
“good”  at  international  law  appears  elastic  enough  to  include  Canada’s  
fresh water supplies.
ii.  Article  301:  National  Treatment
a. Scope of Article 301
Article 301 of NAFTA  states  that  each  Party  must  “accord  national  treatment  to  the  goods  of  another  party.”  The  national  treatment  provisions  
of NAFTA  mandate  that  Canada  must  not  extend  to  the  United  States  
and  Mexico  treatment  “less  favourable”  than  the  “most  favourable  treatment”  extended  to  similar  domestic  goods  and  services.  
The scope and reach of Article 301 is somewhat ambiguous. Trade
experts  and  NAFTA  commentators  have  argued  the  national  treatment  
provisions  do  not  apply  to  exports.45 If this reading were correct, foreign
producers  and  consumers  would  be  precluded  from  claiming  an  equal  
right to, or stake in, Canadian water resources. The argument that Article  301  is  limited  to  imports  is  grounded  in  the  wording  of  the  provision  
which  states,  “each  Party  shall  accord  national  treatment  to the goods of
another party.”  The  limiting  phrase  “goods  of  another  party”  suggests  
that  the  provision  only  applies  to  imports.    
However,  Annex   301.3   seemingly   reincorporates   exports   into   the  
framework   of  Article   301.  Annex   301.3,   an   attachment   to   Chapter   3,  
speciﬁcally  exempts  export  control  measures  on  logs  and  unprocessed  
42  

  Case  7/68,  [1968]  E.C.R.  42  (European  Court  of  Justice).
  Case  45/87,  [1988]  E.C.R.  4929  (European  Court  of  Justice).
44  
WCEL, supra  note  35.  
45  
Little, supra  note  17  at  135.
43  
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ﬁsh  from  the  provisions  of  Article  301.  To  read  Article  301  as  excluding  
exports  would  render  Annex  301.3  superﬂuous.46  Although  this  endeavour is essentially one of statutory interpretation, assuming a coherency
in   drafting,   it   appears   that  Article   301,   by   reference   to  Annex   301.3,  
includes  exports.
b. Substantive Obligations of Article 301
Article 301 mandates that once Canada allows domestic producers to
engage   in   economic   activity   relating   to   water,   at   minimum,   the   same  
rights  must  extend  to  foreign  business  interests.  It  is  important  to  note  
that  Article  301  does  not  dictate  any  substantive  obligations  in  the  absence  of  commercial  activity.  Therefore,  Canada  retains  sovereign  control  over  its  water  resources  until  the  moment  it  allows  water  to  enter  
the  cycle  of  commerce.  However,  if  Canada  allows  water  to  be  removed  
from   its   natural   source,   in   furtherance   of   economic   or   ﬁnancial   ends,  
it  will  be  obligated  to  extend  to  foreign  interests  the  same  commercial  
privileges  and  rights  of  access  as  it  would  to  Canadian  companies.  The  
Council  for  Canadians  summarizes  this  reasoning  by  stating  that  once  
water enters the cycle of commerce, “trading water cannot be limited to
Canadian  companies.”47
iii. Article 309: Import and Export Restrictions
The  import  and  export  restriction  provisions  of  NAFTA are the teeth of
Chapter 3. Article 309 states:
no   Party   may   adopt   or   maintain   any   prohibition   or   restriction   on  
the  importation  of  any  good  of  another  Party  or  on  the  exportation  
or  sale  for  export  of  any  good  destined  for  the  territory  of  another  
Party,  except  in  accordance  with  Article  XI  of  GATT.48

Article  309  prohibits  the  “restriction”  of  exports  or  imports  unless  such  
measures  are  permissible  under  Article  XI  of  the  GATT.49 That article
46  

WCEL, supra  note  35.
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48  
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  Note:  Article  XI  also  includes  a  minor  exception  to  allow  for  trade  restrictions  
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can be distinguished from Article 309 by the fact it allows signatories
to  maintain  export  “duties,  taxes  or  other  charge.”  Read  in  isolation,  Article 309, by operation of GATT  Article  XI,  seems  to  allow  for  a  country  to  place  a  “duty,  tax  or  other  charge”  on  exports.  On  this  reading,  
Canada  need  only  enlist  such  sufﬁciently  high  tariffs  to  stem  the  ﬂow  of  
water  exports.50
However,  Article  314  of  NAFTA  speciﬁcally  prohibits  such  measures.  Article  314  expands  the  ambit  of  Article  309  by  mandating  that  “no  
Party  may  adopt  or  maintain  any  duty,  tax  or  other  charge  on  the  export  
of  any  good”  unless the same restriction is placed on products “destined
for   domestic   consumption.”   When  Article   309   is   read   in   conjunction  
with  Article  314,  it  dictates  that  before  Canada  can  restrict  water  exports  
to  the  United  States  through  the  implementation  of  a  sufﬁciently  high  
“duty,   tax   or   other   charge”,   it   must   impose   similar   measures   on   water destined for domestic consumption. In addition to breaching Article
314,  a  proposed  “duty,  tax  or  other  charge”  would  most  likely  breach  
Canada’s  overarching  NAFTA commitment, outlined in Article 302, to
reduce  and  eliminate  tariffs.  A  political  incentive  and  potential  trade  war  
also  renders  the  duty  approach  a  non-possibility.  Article  XI  of  the  GATT
offers  little  relief  from  Article  309  and  provides  negligible  policy  space  
for  government  to  restrict  water  exports.
iv.  Article  315:  Other  Export  Measures
Article   315   tempers   the   harshness   of  Article   309   by   permitting   trade  
restrictions,   provided   they   are   implemented   “in   relation   to”   a   conservation  measure.  Article  315  accomplishes  this  by  incorporating  GATT
conservation  provisions  Article  XI:  2(a)  and  Article  XX  (g),  (i)  or  (j).  
These  conservation  exemptions,  however,  are  not  absolute.  Attached  to  
Article  315  is  a  “proportionality”  caveat  which  states  that  parties  may  
only  adopt  conservation  based  trade  restrictions  if:
the restriction does not reduce the proportion   of   the   total   export  
shipments   of   the   speciﬁc   good   made   available   to   that   other   Party  
accept  that  the  “domestic  shortages”  saving  provision  of  Article  XI  provides  little  
manoeuvrability  for  restrictive  trade  measures.  To  rely  on  Article  XI,  Canada  would  
have  to  experience  a  “critical  shortage”  before  implementing  a  restriction  on  water  
exports.
50  
  WCEL,  supra  note  35.
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relative to   the   total   supply   of   that   good   of   the   Party   maintaining  
the  restriction  as  compared  to  the  proportion  prevailing  in  the  most  
recent   36-month   period   for   which   data   are   available   prior   to   the  
imposition  of  the  measure,  or  in  such  other  representative  period  on  
which  the  Parties  may  agree.51

Before  examining  Article  315  further,  it  is  pertinent  to  brieﬂy  examine  
the language and judicial interpretations of the GATT  conservation  provisions.
v.  GATT  Conservation  Provisions
Article  XX  (g)  is  the  most  utilized  of  the  GATT  conservation  measures.  
Article  XX  (g)  allows  a  signatory  country  to  implement  an  export  restriction,  provided  it  is  “primarily  aimed  at”  the  conservation  of  an  exhaustible  natural  resource.  The  language  of  Article  XX  (g)  appears  to  allow  
Canada  to  restrict  water  exports  by  drafting  sufﬁciently  sensitive,  conservation  focused  legislation.    Judicial  interpretation  of  Article  XX  (g),  
however,   has   been   less   than   deferential   toward   government   mandated  
‘conservation’  measures.  WTO  Appellate  Body  jurisprudence  has  liberally  interpreted  the  substantive  provision  of  Article  XX  (g),  and  critiqued  
conservation   measures   under   the   provision’s   introductory   clause   (the  
chapeau).  The  chapeau  demands  that  all  conservation  based  trade  restrictions must be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary  or  unjustiﬁable  discrimination  between  countries  where  the  same  
conditions   prevail,   or   a   disguised   restriction   on   international   trade.”52
The WTO case of the Shrimp Turtle I illustrates this trend.53
In the Shrimp  Turtle  I, a U.S. law imposed to protect sea turtles was
deemed  a  valid  measure  under  XX  (g)  but  was  held  to  violate  the  chapeau  of  the  Article.  The  law  met  the  substantive  “relating  to”  test  of  XX  
(g),  in  that  it  was  “narrowly  focused”  on  the  objective  of  protecting  sea  
turtles  and  did  not  cast  a  “disproportionately  wide”  net  in  accomplishing  
the  desired  policy  objective.54 The  application  of  the  law,  however,  vio51  
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lated the chapeau  in  that  it  mandated  environmental  compliance  identical to U.S. practices, applied restrictions inconsistently and did not engage  in  “concerted  and  cooperative  efforts”  to  address  protection.55
This brief case summary of the  Shrimp  Turtle  is  not  intended  to  exhaustively  survey  the  GATT  jurisprudence  on  Article  XX  (g),  rather  it  
is  included  to  illustrate  the  restrictive  nature  of  the  potentially  valuable  
conservation   exemptions   of   the   GATT.   Given   the   strict   judicial   interpretation  of  the  conservation  measures  and  the  WTO  Appellate  Body’s  
apparent distaste for all measures limiting trade, it is unlikely that a
Canadian  law  restricting  water  exports  would  qualify  as  a  genuine  conservation  measure.    
6.  Proportionality  under  Article  315
Even  if  a  Canadian  law  restricting  water  exports  could  qualify  under  the  
rubric  of  Article  XX  (g),  it  would  be  a  pyrrhic  victory  given  the  “proportionality”   requirement   in  Article   315.  Article   315   states   that   once  
Canada  begins  to  export  water  it  cannot  restrict  exports  unless it initiates   a   proportionate   domestic   restriction.   Critics   of  Article   315   decry  
that  if  Canada  begins  to  export  water,  NAFTA signatories are “entitled to
a  proportionate  share  of  Canadian  water  resources  in  perpetuity.”56 The
Council of Canadians argues that “proportionality means that as long as
there  is  a  drop  of  water  left  we  can  never  end  water  exports  regardless  of  
the  environmental  effects  in  Canada  or  the  needs  of  Canadians”57 This
statement, although perhaps hyperbolic, demonstrates the highly contentious and emotionally charged nature of the water debate and captures  the  profound  implications  of  the  Article  315  restriction.  If  Canada  
begins  to  trade  in  water,  the  proportionality  requirement  of  Article  315  
will  make  it  difﬁcult,  if  not  impossible,  to  turn  off  the  proverbial  tap.
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3. CHAPTER 11: INVESTOR RIGHTS
i. Overview
Chapter  11  is  arguably  the  most  controversial  part  of  NAFTA. The investor  rights  provisions  imbue  corporations  with  a  wide  range  of  rights  
including   national   treatment   (1102),   protection   from   expropriation  
(1110) and, perhaps most notably, the right to bring a claim against a
sovereign  country  in  an  international  tribunal  (1116).  Some  critics  argue  
that  although  Article  1116’s  compulsory  “model  of  adjudication”  may  
be   desirable   in   a   strictly   commercial   context,   it   is   not   appropriate   in  
adjudicating broad public policy decisions.58 This  extraordinary  divestment of power to corporations greatly complicates Canada’s ability to
exercise  domestic  water  policy.
Before  delving  into  the  provisions  of  Chapter  11,  it  is  worth  highlighting   some   of   the   distinctive   characteristics   of   the   investor   rights  
section. First, unlike the NAFTA  provisions  governing  trade  in  goods,  
Chapter   11   applies   regardless   of   whether   water   is   characterized   as   a  
“good.”  Notwithstanding  vindication  of  the  Canadian  governments  position   that   water   is   exempt   from   Chapter   3,   the   investor   rights   provisions of NAFTA apply regardless.59  Furthermore,  there  is  no  equivalent  
section  pertaining  to  investor  rights  in  the  GATT.  Although  subsequent  
bilateral  trade  agreements  have  adopted  similar  investment  rights  provisions, NAFTA  was  the  ﬁrst  agreement  to  usher  in  this  new  era  of  corporate rights.60 Finally, the GATT  conservation  measures  of  Article  XX  do  
not  apply  to  Chapter  11.  In  other  words,  the  investor  rights  provisions  of  
NAFTA  apply  irrespective  of  their  effect  on  environmental  or  conservation  initiatives.61
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ii.  Article  1102:  National  Treatment
The  national  treatment  provision  in  Chapter  11  states  that  a  Party  “shall  
accord  to  investors  of  another  Party  treatment  no  less  favourable  than  
it accords, in like circumstances,  to  its  own  investors.”62 The reach of
Article 1102 hinges on the interpretation of the term “in like circumstances.”  
A straightforward reading of Article 1102 mandates that a blanket
prohibition  on  water  export  must  equally  apply  to  both  Canadian  and  
American   investors.   On   this   interpretation,   a   hypothetical   Canadian  
measure   equally   denying   export   licences   to   domestic   and   foreign   investors   would   not   likely   engage  Article   1102.   However,   a   potentially  
more  contentious  issue  arises  where  the  phrase  “in  like  circumstances”  
is   interpreted   to   equate   a   Canadian   investor   seeking   to   provide   water  
services  to  municipalities  in  British  Columbia  with  an  American  investor  seeking  to  provide  Canadian  water  to  a  city  in  California.63 The potential  consequences  of  such  an  expansive  interpretation  of  the  phrase  
“in  like  circumstances”  are  alarming.  This  interpretation  would  essentially  give  American  investors  uninhibited  access  to  Canada’s  vast  water  
resources. Although a paucity of tribunal jurisprudence on the matter
renders  a  deﬁnitive  interpretation  of  this  provision  impossible,  it  would  
be imprudent for Canada to allow the fate of its water to hinge on a
panel interpretation.64
iii. Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation
Article  1110  mandates  that  no  government  shall  engage  in  actions  involving  expropriation,  or  measures  tantamount  to  expropriation:
No   Party   may   directly   or   indirectly   nationalize   or   expropriate   an  
investment  of  an  investor  of  another  Party  in  its  territory  or  take  a  
measure  tantamount  to  nationalization  or  expropriation  of  such  an  
investment  (“expropriation”).65
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Under  Article  1110,  a  corporation  whose  business  interests  have  been  
adversely  affected  is  entitled,  as  of  right,  to  bring  a  claim  against  government. An international tribunal may award damages directly to a
corporation  if  governmental  action  amounts  to  measures  tantamount  to  
expropriation.  
Although  “expropriation”  is  not  deﬁned  under  NAFTA, judicial treatment of Article 1110 has enunciated a broad scope of what constitutes
expropriation.66  The  government  of  Canada  contends  that  a  regulatory  
measure  designed  to  conserve  water  resources  will  not  constitute  expropriation.67 However,  at  least  one  NAFTA panel decision challenges this
view.  In  the  case  of  Pope  and  Talbot,  a  panel  found  that  even  non-discriminatory  regulations  may  amount  to  “measures  tantamount  to  expropriation.”68 This  view  coincides  with  Mr.  Justice  Tysoe’s  interpretation  
of Article 1110 in the case of Mexico  v.  Metaclad  Corp.69 Commenting
on  the  expansive  scope  of  NAFTA’s  expropriation  provisions,  Tysoe,  J.  
stated  that  government  action  as  innocuous  as  municipal  rezoning  may  
offend  Article   1110.  Article   1110   has   proven   a   valuable   weapon   in   a  
corporation’s legal arsenal as witnessed by the fact that the majority of
Chapter  11  claims  have  been  brought  under  this  provision.  The  expropriation  provisions  are  particularly  troubling  in  the  context  of  existing  
water  use  and  export  licences.  
iv.  The  Sun  Belt  Case  
On October 12, 1999 pursuant to Article 1116 of NAFTA, Sun Belt Water,
Inc.  of  California  ﬁled  a  Notice  of  Claim  and  Demand  for  Arbitration.70
Sun   Belt   alleged   that   the   Canadian   federal   government   and   the   British   Columbia   provincial   government   breached   NAFTA Articles 1102,
1105  and  1110.  The  dispute  arose  out  of  a  1986  contract  between  Sun  
Belt and a British Columbia company to jointly engage in bulk water
66
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exports. The  proposal  involved  extracting  water  from  the  internal  waters  
of  British  Columbia  and  transporting  it  via  tanker  to  the  California  city  
of Goleta. The contract was terminated shortly after the agreement was
reached  when  the  provincial  government,  in  response  to  public  outcry  
and national media attention, placed a moratorium on bulk water removals.71  Sun  Belt  is  seeking  damages  in  excess  of  $10  billion,  claiming  
the  B.C.  government  expropriated  future  proﬁts.72
Although the Sun Belt claim has not yet proceeded to arbitration,
the  case  serves  as  a  poignant  reminder  of  how  present  government  action  may  preclude  future  conservation  pathways.  The  extent  of  current  
water  use  and  riparian  right  permits  in  the  hands  of  foreign  investors  is  
unknown.   However,   as   demonstrated   by   the   Sun   Belt   case,   given   the  
potentially   lucrative   rewards   of   litigation,   foreign   investors   could   ﬁle  
claims   asserting   that   a   governmental   denial   of   the   ability   to   exercise  
riparian rights and water use licences for commercial permits amounts
to  expropriation.73

III. CANADA’S PRESENT WATER POLICY
1. Introduction
On  February  10,  1999,  Hon.  Lloyd  Axworthy,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  
Affairs,  and  Hon.  Christie  Stewart,  then  Minister  of  the  Environment,  
announced a three-part strategy to safeguard Canada’s water supply.74
The plan came in the wake of political fallout after an Ontario Company
announced  it  was  going  to  begin  exporting  bulk  water.  The  federal  government’s strategy includes three key elements:
1. Amending the International  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  Act
[IBWTA];;75
2.   A  Canada  wide  accord  prohibiting  bulk  water  transfers;;  and
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3. A joint reference to the International Joint Commission (IJC)
regarding water related issues, including trade, in the Great
Lakes region.76
In  addition  to  the  water  protection  strategy,  the  government  also  reafﬁrmed  its  long-standing  policy  that  “water  is  not  covered  by  the  NAFTA
or  any  other  trade  agreement.”77
i.  Amending  the  International  Boundary  Waters  Treaty  Act  (IBWTA)
The  ﬁrst  part  of  the  government’s  three-pronged  water  strategy  involved  
amending the IBWTA  to  prohibit  bulk  water  removals  from  the  Great  
Lakes basin. The  government  chose  to  legislate  a  bulk  water  removal
ban, as opposed to a bulk water export ban, because a prohibition on
water   removal   “is   more   comprehensive,   environmentally   sound   […]  
and  is  more  consistent  with  Canada’s  international  trade  obligations.”78
During  the  second  reading  of  the  amending  Legislation,  MP  Bill  Blaikie  
questioned  the  logic  of  a  ban  on  bulk  water  removal:  
The   very   language   of   removal   tells   the   story.   The   [government]  
refuse[s]  to  use  the  word  export  because  if  they  talked  about  water  
exports   […]   they   would   have   a   test   case   with   respect   to   NAFTA  
because  NAFTA  deals  with  exports.79

Critics  of  the  government’s  decision  to  alter  the  IBWTA denounce the
limited  geographic  scope  of  the  amendments  as  inadequate  to  protect  all  
of Canada’s water, indicating that the amendments only apply to a limited  number  of  watersheds.  Areas  covered  under  the  prohibition  include  
the  Great  Lakes,  part  of  the  St.  Lawrence  River,  the  St.  Croix  and  Upper  
St.  John  Rivers,  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  Although  the  federal  government’s  exclusive  constitutional  jurisdiction  over  international  treaties  
and  boundary  waters  account  for  the  relative  ease  in  which  the  prohibition was enacted, the same constitutional jurisdiction also accounts for
the  limited  application  of  the  prohibitions.  Given  provincial  jurisdiction  
76
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over  most  natural  resources  under  s.  92(13)  and  s.  92A  of  the  Constitution Act, 1867,  it  is  beyond  the  federal  government’s  constitutional  competency  to  legislate  similar  prohibitions  on  lakes,  rivers  and  watersheds  
that  are  solely  within  the  geographic  conﬁnes  of  a  province.80
ii. Canada Wide Accord on Bulk Water
The  purpose  of  the  Canada-wide  Accord  was  to  ensure  that  all  provinces  
adopted  measures  to  prohibit  bulk  water  removal  over  waters  in  their  
constitutional jurisdiction. The merits of the proposed Accord were debated  by  the  Canadian  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Environment.  The  Accord  never  materialized,  however,  as  Quebec  and  the  three  prairie  provinces  failed  to  endorse  its  mandate.  Nonetheless,  all  provinces  presently  
have  in  place  some  form  of  bulk  water  prohibition.  Provincial  measures  
range  from  legislative  prohibitions,  such  as  British  Columbia’s  Water
Protection  Act,  to  softer  prohibitions  in  the  form  of  ofﬁcial  policy  and  
regulations.81 Although  provincial  measures  adhere  to  the  overarching  
philosophy  of  water  protection,  the  level  of  protection  afforded,  and  the  
means  chosen  to  achieve  the  desired  goals,  vary  greatly.82
During  Parliamentary  debates  on  the  water  accord,  MP  Charles  Caccia,  an  outspoken  critic  of  the  government’s  water  policies,  stated  “the  
proposed  accord  will  lead  to  a  patchwork  of  provincial  initiatives,  thus  
making  Canada  vulnerable  to  trade  challenges.”83 This  critique  is  as  relevant  today  as  it  was  when  the  comments  were  made.  At  present,  Canada  lacks  a  comprehensive,  clear  and  uniform  policy  on  water  exports.  
iii. Reference to the International Joint Commission
The third element of Canada’s strategy to safeguard its water resources was a joint Canadian-American reference to the International Joint
Commission   (IJC).   The   IJC   is   an   independent   bi-national   organization created under the Boundary  Waters  Treaty.84 Its stated purpose is
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to  “help  prevent  and  resolve  disputes  relating  to  the  use  and  quality  of  
boundary  waters  and  to  advise  Canada  and  the  United  States  on  related  
questions.”85 The IJC was charged with studying the potential effects of
bulk  water  removals  or  exports  from  the  Great  Lakes  region.86 On February  22,  2000,  the  IJC  released  its  ﬁnal  report,  entitled  Protection  of  the  
Waters of the Great Lakes.87 The recommendations of the IJC included:
•

Signatories  “should  not  permit  any  new  proposal  for  the  removal  
of water from the Great Lakes Basin to proceed unless the
proponent  can  demonstrate  that  the  removal  would  not  endanger  
the  integrity  of  the  ecosystem  of  the  Great  Lakes  Basin.”

•

In  assessing  a  proposal,  signatories  should  give  “full  
consideration”  to  “potential  cumulative  impacts  of  the  proposed  
removal.”

•

A  proposal  must  ensure  “no  net  loss”  to  the  watershed  from  which  
the water was taken.

•

A proposal must guarantee the water “be returned in a condition
that  protects  the  quality  of  and  prevents  the  introduction  of  alien  
invasive  species  into  the  waters  of  the  Great  Lakes.” 88

Environment  Canada  argues  that,  given  the  adverse  environmental  effects  created  by  bulk  water  removals,  application  of  the  IJC  recommendations  effectively  precludes  bulk  water  transfer.89
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Regarding Canada’s NAFTA obligations, the IJC’s conclusions were
largely  supportive  of  the  measures  and  policies  adopted  by  the  Canadian  
government.90 The IJC stated that “the NAFTA and the GATT agreements  do  not  constrain  or  affect  the  sovereign  right  of  a  government  to  
decide whether or not it will allow natural resources within its jurisdiction  to  be  exploited  and,  if  a  natural  resource  is  allowed  to  be  exploited,  
the  pace  and  manner  of  such  exploitation.”91 In reaching its conclusions,
the Committee appeared to rely on a December 1993 Joint Statement
(discussed  above)  and  a  November  24,  1999  letter  from  the  U.S.  Deputy  
Trade  Representative  to  the  IJC  stating:  “[i]n  our  view,  the  implementation  [of  recommendations  not  to  authorize  or  permit  bulk  water  transfers] would not run afoul of the obligations imposed by international
trade  agreements.”92
The   ﬁndings   of   the   IJC   have   not   been   universally   accepted.   The  
same day the IJC released its report Jamie Dunn, water campaigner for
the  Council  of  Canadians,  expressed  his  “deep  disappointment  that  in  
its  ﬁnal  report  […]  the  International  Joint  Commission  squandered  an  
historic  opportunity  to  speak  for  the  Canada  and  the  United  States.”93
Two  aspects  of  the  IJC  report  require  comment.  First,  the  IJC  is  an  
advisory  body  established  to  inform  the  American  and  Canadian  governments on Great Lakes issues. The report is simply one agency’s opinion.
Although  its  opinion  may  be  utilized  as  a  source  of  treaty  interpretation,  
it is not legally binding. Second, the IJC states that Canada’s international  obligations  do  not  prevent  it  from  taking  measures  to  safeguard  
water resources as long as there is no discrimination against foreign
investors.   This   leads   to   the   conclusion   that   once   bulk   water   removal  
–  or  activity  analogous  to  bulk  water  removal  –  is  permitted,  NAFTA’s
substantive  obligations  apply.  
iv. Summary of the Government Response
Perhaps  the  most  prescient  statement  in  the  IJC’s  ﬁnal  report  was  the  
recommendation that Canada and the United States should limit liability
under the NAFTA by “clearly articulating their water-management poli90
91
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cies in a fully transparent manner, by acting in a manner that is entirely
consistent with their stated policy, and by limiting the time for which
authorizations  are  valid.”94  Canada  has  failed  to  heed  this  advice.  
Although the amendments to the IBWTA  are  an  improvement,  the  
limited geographic application of the Act is problematic. Accepting that
constitutional  sensitivities  preclude  unilateral  federal  action  on  internal  
waters,   nonetheless,   the   federal   government’s   failed   Canada-wide   accord   and   the   existing   provincial   patchwork   of   policy   are   insufﬁcient  
to  guard  against  exposure  to  NAFTA  liability.  The  government  cannot  
delegate  to  the  provinces  the  paramount  responsibility  of  protecting  domestic water resources. Similarly, although the IJC report offers Canada
positive  reinforcement,  the  government  cannot  rely  on  the  report  as  gospel.  The  methodology  of  the  report  is  ﬂawed  in  that  it  relies  on  a  number  
of  soft  sources  that  are  not  legally  binding.  Although  the  Canadian  government’s  three-pronged  plan  has  accomplished  some  positive  change,  
more work needs to be done to safeguard Canada’s water resources. A
comprehensive  and  clearly  articulated  strategy  should  be  implemented.  

IV. PROPOSED POLICY ALTERNATIVES
1. The Need for Action
Beginning with the Canada-United  States  Free  Trade  Agreement, North
America  has  aggressively  pursued  an  agenda  of  economic  integration.95
Recent  events  indicate  that  Canada,  the  United  States  and  Mexico  are  
preparing  to  enter  a  more  interdependent  relationship.  In  a  March  23,  
2005  joint  statement,  all  three  NAFTA signatories announced the formation  of  a  new  “Security  and  Prosperity  Partnership  of  North  America.”96
The  object  of  this  partnership  is  to  achieve  the  “mutually  dependent  and  
complementary”  goals  of  economic  growth  and  enhanced  security.  Two  
of the chief policy aims of the partnership are to “promote sectoral col94  
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laboration  in  energy,  transportation,  ﬁnancial  services,  technology”  and  
to  “reduce  the  costs  of  trade  through  the  efﬁcient  movement  of  goods  
and  people.”97
With this renewed commitment to increased regional reliance, Canada’s water resources will certainly become more of an issue. This realization  has  already  begun  to  take  hold  in  Canadian  political  circles.  At  
the  2005  Liberal  Biennial  Policy  Convention,  the  Ontario  contingent  put  
forth  a  motion  stating  that,  “whereas  legal  experts  have  indicated  that  
water is considered a tradable good under NAFTA  […]  the  Party  should  
encourage  the  Government  to  do  anything  in  its  constitutional  jurisdiction  to  prevent  all  forms  of  water  export.”98 Although the motion was
not  incorporated  into  ofﬁcial  Liberal  Party  policy,  it  demonstrates  that  
internal political opposition to Canada’s longstanding policy of denying
water is a NAFTA  “good”  has  arrived  on  the  national  political  agenda.  
Given  growing  domestic  political  pressure  and  increased  international  
economic integration, it is essential that Canada adopt a clear national
water strategy.
2. Legislation
The  most  obvious  means  to  ensure  absolute  sovereignty  over  Canada’s  
water   resources   is   to   legislate   a   prohibition   on   water   exports.   Such   a  
prohibition  would  not  infringe  provincial  jurisdictional  or  constitutional  
sensitivities,  given  the  federal  government’s  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  
international trade. Furthermore, federal legislation would combat the
problematic patchwork of policy and the sliding scale of water protection  that  presently  exists  across  the  country.  Deﬁnitive  federal  legislation would also adhere to the IJC recommendation of clearly articulating an unambiguous national standard.
Some   key   players   in   the   water   debate   support   the   legislative   approach. The Council of Canadians has continually called on the federal  government  to  implement  a  national  water  act  that  “outline[s]  the  
protections  needed  environmentally  [and]  really  puts  limits  on  the  use  
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and  abuse  of  our  water  from  industry.”99 The  West  Coast  Environmental Law Association (WCEL) similarly concludes, “the best federal
approach   for   preventing   bulk   water   removals   from   Canada   is   the   enactment  of  federal  legislation  designed  speciﬁcally  for  the  purpose  [of  
preventing  exports].”100
Although  the  ease  with  which  the  federal  government  could  implement  a  prohibition  on  water  exports  is  attractive,  there  are  a  number  of  
problems associated with this approach. First, as stated in a legal opinion drafted by the WCEL, “no matter how carefully designed, Canadian
measures  to  prevent  bulk  water  exports  or  diversion  projects  would  still  
be  vulnerable  to  trade  challenges  and/or  investor-state  claims.”101 The
national  treatment  provisions  of  Article  301  and  1102  negate  the  possibility   of   prohibiting   exports   without   implementing   similar   domestic  
measures.    As  the  above  discussion  on  Article  1102  notes,  the  phrase  
“in  like  circumstances”  may  require  extending  any  prohibition  on  water  
exports  to  include  transfers  between  provinces  or  even  regions  within  
a  province.  The  political  and  economic  feasibility  of  such  a  domestic  
constraint  is  highly  questionable.  
Proposals  to  circumvent  NAFTA  liability  almost  universally  suggest  
crafting  legislation  with  an  environmental  objective,  aimed  not  at  trade  
but rather couched in terms of regulating the general use and conservation   of   water.   This   was   the   approach   taken   by   the   federal   government in amending the IBWTA.  When  extended  to  provincial  Canadian  
watercourses,  however,  this  suggestion  is  inherently  self-defeating.  The  
federal  government  must  ground  any  water  prohibition  in  its  exclusive  
constitutional  jurisdiction  over  international  trade.  The  irony  is  that  by  
crafting  legislation  prohibiting  exports  under  the  federal  government’s  s.  
91  international  trade  powers,  it  contravenes  NAFTA Article 309 (import
and  export  restrictions)  and  potentially  the  national  treatment  provisions  
of  Article  302  and  1102.  By  crafting  environmentally  based  legislation  
prohibiting  bulk  water  a  removal,  however,  the  federal  government  encroaches  on  provincial  authority  over  natural  resources.  The  proposed  
Canada  wide  accord  was  the  federal  government’s  solution  to  this  quandary.    The  obvious  shortfall  of  any  proposal  similar  to  the  Canada  wide  
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accord  is  its  voluntary  nature  and  the  wide  latitude  the  provinces  will  
almost certainly demand in crafting and implementing the policy.
Second,  any  suggestion  of  water  export  legislation  is  contradictory  
to  the  long-standing  government  position  that  water  does  not  qualify  as  
a NAFTA  “good.”    At  a  February  1999  press  conference  following  the  
announcement  of  the  government’s  water  policy,  Hon.  Lloyd  Axworthy  
was  asked  why  the  government  did  not  simply  legislate  a  ban  on  exports.    He  replied,  “[O]nce  you  start  doing  that  then  you  make  water  into  
a tradable commodity and it gets subject to all the trade rules going back
to GATT  of  1947 […]  We’re  saying  there’s  a  much  more  effective  way  
of  doing  it  and  that  is  to  treat  it  in  its  natural  state.”102 The  government’s  
blanket   refusal   to   consider   water   as   a   “good”   essentially   precludes   a  
host  of  policy  alternatives.  This  threshold  denial  of  NAFTA’s application  to  water  forecloses  the  possibility  of  export  legislation.
Third,  some  critics  suggest  that,  even  if  non-discriminatory  legislation   could   be   crafted,   it   would   be   nonsensical   for   the   government   to  
place   an   outright   ban   on   such   a   potentially   lucrative   investment.  The  
sentiment that Canada is failing to harness the economic power of its
water   resources   is   captured   by   Former   Newfoundland   Premier   Roger  
Grimes   who   felt   that   by   banning   water   exports   from   Gisborne   Lake,  
“we’re   just   letting   it   spill   into   the   ocean.”103 A legislated prohibition
on  water  export  would  thwart  provincial  aspirations  to  utilize  water  resources  as  a  revenue  stream.
Even  though  federal  legislation  prohibiting  water  exports  will  most  
likely infringe NAFTA  Articles  309  (export  restrictions),  315  (proportionality)   and   potentially   the   national   treatment   provisions   301   and  
1102,  many  environmental  organizations  advocate  immediate  action.104
The  question  of  when  (or  if)  to  legislate  is  essentially  a  policy  decision  
that  the  federal  government  will  have  to  make  after  analyzing  the  costs  
associated  with  pre-emptive  unilateral  action.  Irrespective  of  when  legislation  is  contemplated,  one  thing  is  clear:  sooner  or  later  the  government must negotiate with its NAFTA partners.
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3. International Avenues
The  most  effective  means  to  secure  control  of  Canada’s  water  resources  
is  to  create  sufﬁcient  space  for  policy  options  within  the  NAFTA framework. NAFTA  contains  a  number  of  mechanisms  for  amendments,  exclusions and adoptions. Reliance on these measures is the most appropriate  way  to  ensure  sovereign  dominion  over  Canada’s  water.
The  most  obvious  way  to  avoid  NAFTA  liability  is  to  avoid  NAFTA.
Under  Article  2205,  Canada  is  permitted  to  withdraw  from  NAFTA with
six  months  notice.  Although  withdrawal  is  perhaps  an  economically  unfeasible  solution  (87%  of  Canada’s  trade,  and  62%  of  Canada’s  wealth  
is  dependent  of  the  U.S.),  it  does  illustrate  a  ﬁne  point:  Canada’s  water  
resources are ultimately within its control.105    The  real  question  is  the  
amount  of  political  capital  Canada  is  prepared  to  expend  in  reasserting  
that control.
A less drastic option is to negotiate a broad NAFTA-wide  exemption  
for   water   export   controls.  Article   2102   provides   an   almost   unlimited  
scope to amend NAFTA.   Under  Article   2102,   a   Party   may   effect   any  
“modiﬁcation   or   addition”   given   such   measures   are   agreed   on   by   all  
the  parties.  Governments  have  used  this  provision  to  insulate  national  
security   from   trade   obligations.   The   advantage   of  Article   2102   is   its  
reach. All other NAFTA-amending  mechanisms  lack  the  wholesale  coverage that Article 2102 engages. The omnibus nature of Article 2102,
however,  is  a  double-edged  sword.  Given  the  breadth  and  scope  of  such  
a  powerful  exclusionary  provision,  the  Article  is  reserved  for  only  the  
most  essential  economic  spheres;;  trade  in  water  may  not  qualify.  Similarly,  the  inherent  contradiction  of  excluding  goods  from  a  liberal  trade  
agreement  –  particularly  a  good  that  was  not  excluded  upon  the  negotiation of NAFTA – runs contrary to the spirit of NAFTA. Negotiating a
general  exception  may  prove  an  insurmountable  barrier  given  Canada’s  
political and economic clout.
A  less  invasive  means  of  shielding  water  from  NAFTA liability is to
negotiate  water  conservation  agreements  with  the  other  NAFTA signatories   and   have   them   added   as   attachments.  Article   104.2   speciﬁcally  
envisions  such  action  by  allowing  parties  to  attach  bilateral  or  trilateral  
environmental  agreements  to  Annex  104.  Presently  Annex  104  includes  
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two bilateral agreements: A Canada-U.S. Agreement on Transboundary
Movement  of  Hazardous  Waste  and  a  Mexico-U.S.  Agreement  on  Protection   and   Improvement   of   the   Environment   in   the   Border  Area.  An  
Annex   104   conservation   or   environmental   agreement   prohibiting   the  
removal  and  export  of  water  would  take  precedence  over  countervailing  
NAFTA  provisions.
Another  alternative  is  to  petition  the  NAFTA Commission to issue
an  interpretive  statement  under  Article  1131.2.  Such  a  statement  could  
stipulate  that  the  deﬁnition  of  “investment”,  presently  outlined  in  Article  1139,  does  not  include  water  permits,  licences  or  other  related  activities.106 This statement may take a similar form as the December 1993
Joint  Statement.  Such  an  interpretive  statement,  however,  would  only  
extend  to  Chapter  11,  thus  leaving  open  Chapter  3  liability.
The  Canadian  government  could  also  circumvent  the  investor  provisions   of   NAFTA   by   jointly   amending  Annex   1138.2.  This   provision  
allows  for  Parties,  on  mutual  agreement,  to  prevent  a  corporation  from  
seeking  a  remedy  for  a  particular  activity.  This  measure  essentially  estoppes corporations from bringing a Chapter 11 claim. Canada could
lobby the other NAFTA  signatories  to  include  an  explicit  exclusion  for  
legislation  prohibiting  bulk  water  removals  or  exports.107
The   above   recommendations   would   be   of   varying   effectiveness.  
Amending  Article  2201  or  adding  a  conservation  treaty  to  Annex  104  
are   likely   the   most   effective   measures   for   Canada   to   pursue.  Amendments  to  Articles  1131.2  or  1138.2  do  not  enjoy  the  scope  of  the  above  
measures,  however  they  do  grant  immunity  against  Chapter  11  claims.  
All  proposed  amendments,  however,  share  one  essential  trait:  they  are  
premised on an assumption that Canada is willing, or able, to engage
in  the  necessary  negotiation  and  compromise  involved  in  amending  an  
international agreement.

CONCLUSION
The  likelihood  of  a  global  water  shortage  is  quickly  becoming  a  reality.  
As this most precious of resources dwindles, water will become a chief
consideration in national security and economic policy. Canada is in the
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enviable  position  of  holding  one  ﬁfth  of  the  world  fresh  water  supplies.  
Although  Canada’s  ownership  of  its  vast  freshwater  resources  is  certain,  
its  ability  to  manage  and  control  its  water  resources  is  not  as  deﬁnite.  
A host of NAFTA  provisions   threaten  to  impeach  Canada’s   sovereignty  over  its  water  resources.  Chapter  3’s  national  treatment  provision  
(Article  301),  prohibition  on  export  controls  (Article  309)  and  proportionality  requirement  (Article  315)  collectively  restrict  government  action.   The   investor   rights   provisions   of   Chapter   11   allow   for   corporations  to  bring  claims  for  breach  of  national  treatment  provisions  (Article  
1102)  and,  perhaps  more  invasively,  claim  that  a  government  action  is  
“tantamount  to  expropriation”  (Article  1110).
The  Canadian  government’s  response  to  trade  concerns  has  been  insufﬁcient  to  adequately  safeguard  its  water  resources.  Trapped  between  
Constitutional constraints and international trade obligations, the federal  government  has  failed  to  establish  a  clear  and  comprehensive  national  
water  policy.  The  government’s  three-pronged  strategy,  although  effective  in  safeguarding  boundary  waters,  is  limited  in  scope.  By  allowing  
the  provinces  to  determine  water  protection  priority  and  measures,  the  
government  has  allowed  for  the  development  of  a  patchwork  of  provincial  policies  of  varying  effectiveness.
As North American integration proceeds at a remarkable pace, it is
paramount that Canada “clearly articulate a water management policy in
a  fully  transparent  manner.”108  Given  that  federal  legislation  will  almost  
certainly  violate  Canada’s  international  obligations,  the  most  desirable  
route is through political negotiation and compromise. Only through
amendments to NAFTA can Canada once again become author of its
own future.
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